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I. INTRODUCTION
A range of evidence exists demonstrating the relationship between social capital and some important socio-economic outcomes. Using a variety of proxies, social capital has been shown to have substantial predictive power across a range of domains, including economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001) , trade (Guiso et al., 2008) , well-functioning institutions (Knack, 2002) , corruption and crime (Uslaner, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2009 ) and well working financial markets (Guiso et al., 2004) . While this literature demonstrates large and long-lived within and across country differences in values and social norms, rather less is known about the origins of these differences.
Recently a body of research has developed which aims to examine the formulation of different types of social capital. Generally this literature analyzes the relationship between historical events or historical sources of variation and current levels of social capital. For instance, Durante (2010) demonstrates how trust developed in pre-industrial times as a form of mutual insurance for agrarian societies to cope with climatic risk. He shows that contemporary surveyed variation in trust across Europe is positively related to higher temporal volatility in climatic conditions in the 16 th century. In a similar vein, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) relate current levels of trust within Africa to historical variation in the geography of slave-trade related raids. While Tabellini (2010) shows that current civic values in Italy are correlated with historical variables (political institutions in the period from 1600 to 1850) and that the component of culture explained by history is strictly correlated by current regional economic development. Other research on Italy examines the link between geographical variation in casualties during the unification process that may have undermined trust towards authorities and election turnout (Amodio, 2012) ; or the emergence of free-city states in the Middle Ages, the formation of informal pacts and social capital (Guiso et al., 2008) . Finally, Jacob and Tyrell (2010) show how the density of Stasi informers in the former GDR is negatively related to social capital levels in today's East Germany. The persistence in social norms is also documented by , who find that localities where pogroms against Jews took place during the Black Death epidemic in the 14 th century showed higher levels of deportations and persecution of Jews 600 years later, during the interwar period. In addition, find that the support to anti-Semitic parties in Germany in 1890 and 1920-30s is strongly correlated with anti-Semitic attitudes expressed in opinion surveys in 1996 and 2006.
While this literature suggests long-lasting differences in social capital there is other work demonstrating how social capital can be influenced by contemporaneous factors, and hence should be viewed as malleable. Much of this literature shows that social capital can be adversely affected by increasing 'openness', migration and mixing of communities. For instance, Di Pasquale and Glaeser (1999) show that expected mobility reduces social capital, while Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) , Costa and Kahn (2003) and Freire and Li (2013) argue that social capital is affected by inequality and the 3 heterogeneity of communities. These results are in line with the theoretical model proposed by Glaeser et al. (2002) according to which social capital investment increases when the return to social skills is higher and in communities with higher aggregate social capital, while it tends to decreases with age and relocation to a different community. According to these arguments, the increased mobility that has been witnessed over the past two centuries should act to dissipate differences in social capital across individuals or groups of individuals. The main thrust of our paper is to investigate whether these populations show different levels of civic capital compared to "Italian" groups living in the same geographical area. This is an interesting setting in so far as Southern Italy is noted for its poor endowment of social capital (see for instance, Bertoni et al, 2013 and Paccagnella and Sestito 2014) . The Arbëreshë people, apart from preserving a distinct language, may have preserved distinct social values, which could be pre-determined or the result of their attempt to be accepted in a hosting country.
We show that this group of individuals displays significantly higher levels of civic capital than comparable indigenous groups. Moreover, this is observable for a period (immediate post war) where there was limited inter-regional mobility and interaction with other areas; but has not diminished markedly in the following half century when mobility substantially increased. This result is important as it demonstrates how substantial variations in civic capital can be created by specific historical episodes, and that these differences may be very long lasting. This latter point is of clear interest if one considers, as per the literature highlighted above, that social capital has a key role in explaining cross-country and within-4 country variations in institutional and economic performance. In addition, our result is of interest insofar as it has implications for the role of large-scale migration on social norms.
To deal with the endogeneity issues that might plague our results we firstly look at successively more restrictive geographic comparisons: more proximate areas should differ less in terms of unobserved characteristics that influence both civic capital and voter turnout. Then, as an alternative strategy we adopt an instrumental variable approach and use as a source of variation the historical location of two seminaries that contributed greatly to the preservation of the Arbëreshë culture. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged and instrumental variable estimates are larger in magnitude compared to OLS estimates, suggesting that unobservable confounding factors produced a downward bias.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II it is provided information on the historical background. Section III discusses the identification strategy, while section IV presents the data and the details on the treated and control municipalities. Section V presents the main results. Section VI offers some robustness checks and section VII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
We focus on a unique migration event that occurred in Italy in the late sixteenth century following the invasion of the Balkans by the Ottoman Turks. There is a general agreement that the migration period was from 1448 to 1543 and that there were three main waves (see Scaglione, 1921, and Zangari, 1940) . The first two migrations waves (1448-1459) were the consequence of the political alliance between the Albanian chieftain George Kastrioti Skanderbeg, who unified the Albanian tribes against the Ottoman invasion, and the Italian aristocracy (Pedio, 1943 No reliable historical sources exist to establish whether these migrants, compared to the indigenous populations living in the same areas, were from a 'better' social background. However, modern historians argue that Albanian high-caste dignitaries were not present among the refugees of the 16 th century nor among the other migration waves. Instead, these immigrants were ordinary people accompanied by a few Orthodox priests. Similar to the other populations living in the area, they were mainly shepherds, farmers, peasants, while nobles and wealthier people moved to major towns, such as Venice, Naples and Palermo (Bugliaro, 2002) . Nevertheless, we are not able to establish whether these immigrants left their country with different resources in terms of both human and social capital and whether these recourses were passed to the following generations.
Possibly as a consequence of the fact that their way of life did not disturb the status quo, and because they have been in many circumstances loyal to the Italian state, they were accepted and they have lived peacefully in southern Italy for more than 500 years. The Arbëreshë have never had a political or ethnic conflict with the Italian State and never claimed or desired separation or autonomy. Instead, they consider themselves Italians who in addition have Albanian origins (Derhemi, 2002) . 4 The Arbëreshë strongly contributed to the Italian Risorgimento and to the military campaigns that lead to the country unification in 1861. To give an idea of the role played by this minority for the Italian unification process it is useful to report that three of the six ministers appointed by Garibaldi (who commanded and fought in many military campaigns that led to the formation of a unified Italy) for his provisional government were from Arbëreshë villages.
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No information exists regarding which villages were populated by Albanians in the 16 th century.
Some historical information is available on villages whose origin is thought to have been Albanian but which now retain no or slight traces of their past heritage. 6 The first reliable information on Albanian 6 communities in Italy is from the 1861 census of the Italian population, which provides information of the share of population speaking the Arbërisht in each village. From this source we found that in 47 villages there was a share of population (ranging from 4% to 100%) speaking Arbërisht. 7 This share was smaller than 50% in only five villages, while in the others on average 91% of the population has preserved the Arbërisht language.
Currently, the Arbëreshë minority is estimated to number approximately 90,000-100,000 people living mainly in 41 villages in which most of the inhabitants still preserve the Arbërisht language and observe Greek orthodox rites (Altimari and Savoia, 1994) . In our analysis we consider as Arbëreshë the 41 villages still now preserving these traits. However, our results remain qualitatively unchanged even if we 
III. DATA
Arbëreshë villages are in many ways similar to other villages of southern Italy (there are no differences in the house type, land use, diet, clothing, education), however, after more than 500 years from A key issue in examining social capital is measurement. As highlighted by Guiso et al (2010) , it is increasingly clear that social capital is an ambiguous term that has been invoked in a range of ways that are not necessarily consistent. 9 Guiso et al (2010) suggest the alternative concept of "civic capital" as a set of values and beliefs that facilitate co-operation. Specifically, it is these "persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities" (Guiso et al, 2010, p. 3).
Existing empirical work aimed at measuring civic capital focuses on one of two approaches. The first approach is to use survey responses on questions regarding trust, such as those commonly included in the major value or social surveys. An alternative approach is based on revealed-preference style proxies that are connected to civic capital by some view of socialization; such as charitable giving or election turnout.
In this paper, we focus on these latter types of measures as we believe that these measures are more convincing as stakes are attached to this behavior.
More precisely, we focus on a variety of measures of voter turnout, which fits with a key concept of civic capital, the propensity to cooperate and help in the creation of collective goods (Amodio, 2012; Guiso et al. 2010) . We firstly consider referenda turnout since this is a measure of social capital widely used in the economic literature. However, as we only have data for the 2011 Italian referenda, 10 we also consider European Election turnout for the period 1979-2014. European elections are comparable with referenda since turnout at these elections is unlikely to be driven by economic incentives; 11 due to these reasons data on these elections have been already used as a proxy of civic capital (see for instance Amodio, 2012; Barone and Mocetti, 2014) .
Finally, we also examine participation at the Italian parliamentary elections of the lower house of the Parliament (Camera dei Deputati), in general elections. Existing research demonstrates that generalized interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity are strongly correlated to turnout (Newton, 1997; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonard and Nanetti, 1993; Seligson, 1999) . A key advantage of these data is that they cover a relatively long period , which allows us to investigate if civic behavior has changed 9 This raises concerns regarding the measurement of social capital, how it can be 'accumulated', and more fundamentally the comparability of research that often uses vastly different proxies to measure its effect. 10 Unfortunately, data on turnout at the most relevant referenda held in Italy are not available at municipality level. Data on important Italian referenda asking people to express their views on issues such as the legalization of divorce (1974) and abortion (1981) are only available at provincial level and as a result we cannot use them for our analysis. 11 The supranational nature of the European Parliament makes electoral turnout less subject to contamination problems due to patronage. In practice, this restricts our sample to about 961 municipalities, 41 Arbëreshë municipalities (treated group) and 920 indigenous municipalities, located in five different regions (Molise, Basilicata, Apulia, Calabria and Sicily).
As shown in Table 1 , average turnout in Arbëreshë municipalities is higher than turnout in indigenous municipality both when considering the 2011 referenda and European elections. Instead, the reverse is true when we look at turnout at national elections.
[TABLE 1]
To control for municipalities' demographic characteristics, we match each election with the closest Italian Census of Population held every ten years (we use data from 1951 to 2001). 12 We have information on the size of resident population, the average level of employment, the educational attainment of the population and the percentage of people aged 65 or over. 13 We use this information to compare Arbëreshë and indigenous municipalities. In Table 2 characteristics at the time of elections, such as the population size, the average number of years of education of the inhabitants, the fraction of employed people in the population, the fraction of elderly people; i ϕ and t µ are respectively region or province (more disaggregated) and an electoral year fixed effect, whereas it e is the stochastic error term of the model.
Arbëreshë villages are a subset of all original villages that were settled or repopulated by the Albanians, and this maintenance of tradition is likely to be non-random. A concern would be that those areas, with unobservable characteristics more likely to lead to different levels of social capital, are also related to differential likelihood of the maintenance of these traditions. For instance, more isolated areas may be less likely to converge to Italian social norms in both terms of observed traditions and voting behavior.
To examine this issue we firstly look at successively more restrictive geographic comparisons. Again the underlying idea is that more proximate areas should differ less in terms of unobserved characteristics that influence both civic capital and voter turnout. A difficulty with the provincial fixed effects is that this implicitly throws out comparison municipalities that, while proximate, are across provincial boundaries.
Then, we estimate variants of our model where we successively reduce the comparison group to municipalities within 60kms and 30kms of an Arbëreshë municipality.
Finally, we use the historical location of two seminaries that according to researches gave a great contribution to the preservation of the Arbëreshë culture as a source of variation. This information is at the basis of our 2SLS estimation strategy, specifying the model presented above as follows: As we only observe the sub-set of Arbëreshë communities still maintaining some peculiar traits, our instrument relies on the idea (supported for instance by Altimari, 2002, and Cucci, 2007 ) that cultural resilience has been affected by the closeness to two seminaries, founded to provide free education to the 11 Arbëreshë clergy. Then, we instrument our dummy i Arbereshe with the distance of each municipality to the municipality in which is located the closest seminary. Since the two seminaries are located one in mainland Italy (San Demetrio) and the other on the island of Sicily (Palermo), we consider the distance from the Sicilian seminary for municipalities located in that region and the distance from the one located in the mainland for all the others. 16 Clearly the initial location choice for the seminaries may not have been random. Nevertheless, their construction occurred in the eighteenth century and we argue that these location choices were driven by factors that are unlikely to be directly related to current civic behavior. As one may expect the effect of proximity to be non-linear, we introduce a quadratic term in distance. We also alternatively include region or province fixed effects. For all our turnout measures these reveal a statistically significant relationship. For instance, as shown in column (1), where we only control for regional dummies, referendum turnout is 2.7 percentage points higher in Arbëreshë communities. Since turnout at referendum in indigenous municipalities is on average 53% this implies an increase in turnout of about 5%.
V. OLS RESULTS

[TABLE 3]
As shown in column (3), the corresponding relationship is 3.4 percentage points for turnout at the European elections (on a base of about 66% this translates in an increase of about 5%). The relationship between turnout at general elections and Arbëreshë (column 4) shows a similar albeit smaller effect, with a 1% increase in turnout.
Models reported in columns (2), (4) and (6), introduce controls for a range of potential confounders.
These explanatory variables are related to voter turnout in a manner that fits with previous literature and intuition. For instance, the rate of illiteracy is negatively related with turnout, while the share of employed population is positively related with turnout. Introducing these controls substantially improves the 'fit' of 12 these models but does not substantively change the key estimate of interest. 17 These remain statistically significant for all of our turnout measures.
We control for the average number of years of education of population in estimates for referendum turnout and European election. This is not included in the national election estimates that cover longer time periods, as it is not readily available for the older censuses.
These relationships are essentially conditional associations and a number of factors exist that may prevent them from being treated causally, related to variations in unobservable characteristics between
Arbëreshë and non-Arbëreshë communities that may be correlated with turnout behavior and civic capital in general. Our first attempt to address this is to restrict the level of comparison by introducing provincelevel fixed effects to our estimates. In this way we seek to wash out unobservable factors influencing turnout behavior that relate to specific areas of Italy. The resultant estimates of the models including the full set of controls are provided in Table 4 .
Our key estimate now can be interpreted as the within province variation in turnout behavior associated with a community being Arbëreshë. As shown in columns (1), (2) and (3) for turnout at referendum, European and general elections respectively, while there is some movement in the point estimates, there remains a positive and statistically significant relationship between Arbëreshë communities and voter turnout behavior. The magnitude of the effects is similar, slightly smaller, to that found when controlling for regional dummies.
[TABLE 4]
As an alternative approach to within-province estimation we also looked at successively more restrictive geographic comparisons. Again the underlying idea is that more proximate areas should differ less in terms of unobserved characteristics that influence both civic capital and voter turnout. Here, we use provincial fixed effects and estimate variants of our models from Table 4 , including the full set of controls (not reported to save space), where we successively reduce the comparison group to municipalities within 60kms and 30kms of an Arbëreshë municipality. 18 These estimates are reported in Table 5 . These reveal that our initial results remain in essence even in the most narrow geographic comparison group. 17 These results do not change qualitatively also when we control for the average income per capita in each municipality and for a poverty index (only available starting form 2009). These results are not reported and available upon request. 18 The National Statistical Office (ISTAT) provides the geo-coding of all the Town Halls of the 8101 Italian municipalities. Through these data, for each municipality the "crow's flight" distance with each of the Arbëresh municipalities is calculated. If the minimum of these distances is larger than the threshold, the municipality is discarded from the analysis.
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Taken together this is supportive of a causal difference insofar as neighboring municipalities, controlling for observed differences, differ markedly in their turnout behavior on the basis of their ethnic composition. This evidence is suggestive of differences of behavior that reflect higher levels of civic capital within Arbëreshë municipalities.
[TABLE 5]
Having established a contemporaneous relationship between Arbëreshë communities and our indicator of civic capital, a natural question is whether this difference in behavior represents a diminished differential compared to, for instance, larger differences from the native population upon initial immigration. In this sense, we are interested in whether there is an indication of assimilation of immigrant behavior towards the norms of the recipient country. To investigate this we use the general election turnout data to examine behavior across the post-war period. While this is not the same as examining changes in behavior since the 17 th century, it provides indicative evidence insofar as the post-war period represents one of increased geographic and social mobility. Specifically, we introduce a linear time trend, t, and an interaction term between the dummy denoting Arbëreshë municipalities and the time trend, Arbereshe*t, among the regressors.
As shown in column (7) and (8) there is a general decline in turnout over the period of approximately 0.3 of a percentage point per year (we observe 18 elections in our data period). The interaction term between Arbëreshë municipalities, while negative is not statistically significant at standard levels. This suggests that at best there is weak evidence of convergence of Arbëreshë and non-Arbëreshë behavior over the post-war periods. We contend that this, in addition to earlier estimates, is a powerful result insofar as it demonstrates the ability of different civil capital to persist even during a period of increasing mobility and interaction.
VI. Instrumental Variable Results
Despite our attempts to investigate the sensitivity of our results to appropriate comparison areas, we cannot rule out that our results are driven by underlying differences in unobservable characteristics. As explained above, a particular concern is that we are measuring the effect of ex post being an Arbëreshë community. This is a concern as this is a subset of areas where initial settlement occurred and the maintenance of tradition is likely to be non-random. Most critically, those areas where differences in underlying civic capital were greatest may be those municipalities where we might expect these communities to survive as recognizably distinct groups. We seek to directly examine this source of bias using an instrumental variable approach that exploits exogenous variation in the likelihood of maintaining traditions. Table 6 provides the IV estimates that correspond to equations (2) and (3). Panel B of the Table   provides the first stage estimates. These reveal a strong negative relationship between distance to a seminary location and being an Arbëreshë community. The square term is positive, and the turning point separates out the most distant quartile of the (the turning point is between 130 and 180km according to specifications). Our instruments pass standard tests for weak instruments. The value of 2 χ in all specifications is well above the standard thresholds.
Panel A of Table 6 reports second stage estimates for region and province fixed effects models controlling for the full set of controls. In the specifications including province fixed effects only municipalities located in provinces in which there is at least one Arbëreshë community are included in the sample (being included in a province in which Arbëreshë are absent perfectly predicts the outcome variable and is dropped from our probit estimates). In all specifications standard errors are bootstrapped (100 replications).
In both the regional and province fixed effects models, the IV estimates are positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the difference in turnout behavior between Arbëreshë and indigenous municipalities is larger in regional fixed effects estimates than in province fixed effects estimates. In all cases we find that the instrumental variables estimates are larger in size compared to OLS estimates. For instance, as shown in column (2), when controlling for province fixed effects, referendum turnout is 5.4
percentage points higher in Arbëreshë communities (which on a base of 53% implies an increase of about 10%). The corresponding effect is 5.6 percentage points for national elections (column 6), which implies a 7% increase. Instead, in the case of turnout at European elections this estimate is particularly large: 17 percentage points.
All in all, these results suggest that our earlier estimates are not being driven by non-random maintenance of traditions.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
There is an increasing body of research, which seeks to understand the extent to which differences in social, and particularly civic capital lead to differences in economic and social behavior. This paper adds to this literature focusing on a unique historical immigration event in Italy in the 16 th Century. This is of interest insofar as it represents the mass settlement of a group with markedly different traditions into an established society.
Focusing on an established measure of civic capital, voter turnout, our initial results suggest that despite the long time since this event these communities still display different, higher, civic capital than other comparable Italian communities. This survives a number of robustness checks including focusing on 15 very small geographic points of comparison and instrumental variable estimation aimed at addressing the non-random maintenance of traditions.
We are not able to demonstrate whether these immigrants were characterized by pre-immigration differences in social capital or whether an attitude toward cooperation and trust has developed as a consequence of the facts following their immigration. Nevertheless we think our analysis is important to document long-term persistence in differences in social capital. A point of novelty from previous literature is to consider how this variation in behavior has evolved over the past 60 years. This is motivated by the belief that initial differences in attitudes and behavior are likely to be eroded over time, especially in recent decades when regional mobility and the general level of regional interaction has increased. We find Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. We control for regional fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Note: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. We control for province fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Notes: The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. We control for province fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year (with the exception of column 4). Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level The dependent variable is voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters on the number of individuals eligible to vote. We control for regional (odd columns) or provincial (even columns) fixed effects and for electoral year dummies (not reported) in all the regressions were turnout is observed for more than one year. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***,**,* indicate that coefficients are statistically significant respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
